Public health

Tobacco industry efforts subverting International Agency for Research on Cancer’s second-hand smoke study

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Scientific reports on second-hand smoke have stimulated legislation on clean indoor air in the USA, but less so in Europe. Recently, the largest European study, by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), demonstrated a 16% increase in the point estimate of risk in lung cancer for nonsmokers, a result consistent with earlier studies. However, the study was described by newspapers and the tobacco industry as demonstrating no increase in risk. To understand the tobacco industry’s strategy on the IARC study we analysed industry documents released in US litigation and interviewed IARC investigators. The Philip Morris tobacco company feared that the study (and a possible IARC monograph on second-hand smoke) would lead to increased restrictions in Europe so they spearheaded an inter-industry, three-prong strategy to subvert IARC’s work. The scientific strategy attempted to undercut IARC’s research and to develop industry-directed research to counter the anticipated findings. The communications strategy planned to shape opinion by manipulating the media and the public. The government strategy sought to prevent increased smoking restrictions. The IARC study cost $2 million over ten years; Philip Morris planned to spend $2 million in one year alone and up to $4 million on research. The documents and interviews suggest that the tobacco industry continues to conduct a sophisticated campaign against conclusions that second-hand smoke causes lung cancer and other diseases, subverting normal scientific processes.

Panel 1: IARC and major summaries evaluating risk of lung cancer in passive smokers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Relative risk (and 95% CI)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IARC†</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Europe†</td>
<td>1·16 (spousal) (0·93–1·44) 1·17 (workplace) (0·94–1·45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health†</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1·20–1·30 (N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Environmental Protection Agency†</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1·20 (N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Health and Medical Research Council†</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1·32 (1·10–1·69)</td>
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<tr>
<td>US EPA‡</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1·19 (1·01–1·39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Research Council‡</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1·34 (1·18–1·53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon General‡</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1·53 (N/A)</td>
</tr>
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*Confidence intervals are two-tailed 95%, except US EPA which is one-tailed 95% (two tailed 90%).
†Seven European countries.
N/A=not applicable.

This journal publication was not, however, the first the public had heard of the IARC study. On March 8, 1998, the London Sunday Telegraph reported that WHO was withholding a study that not only failed to show that passive smoking caused lung cancer but also might even demonstrate a protective effect. British American Tobacco (BAT), which had held private media briefings to ensure “balanced” coverage of the forthcoming study, was suspected to have fuelled the story. BAT responded that it knew of IARC’s preliminary results from earlier conferences and IARC’s biennial report, which had reported the study’s progress by providing results but no conclusion. Despite press releases from WHO* and


In 1978, a confidential study for the US Tobacco Institute concluded that public concern about second-hand smoke, also referred to as environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and “passive smoking”, was “the most dangerous threat to the viability of the tobacco industry that has yet occurred”. The industry’s concern was born out as three landmark reports concluded that second-hand smoke did cause lung cancer and other diseases, leading to legislation on smoke-free environments in the USA. Few such studies had been done in Europe, and European countries have been slower to implement smoke-free measures.

This European situation was poised for change when the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), a research branch of the World Health Organization (WHO), undertook, from 1988, the largest European epidemiological study on lung cancer and second-hand smoke. Consistent with earlier studies (panel 1), IARC observed a 16% increase in risk for nonsmoking spouses of smokers (95% CI 0·93–1·44), and a 17% increase for nonsmokers’ exposure in the workplace (95% CI 0·94–1·45). The study was too small to detect, with 95% confidence, an increase in risk of around 16%, the sample size having been selected to have enough power to detect a relative risk of 1·3. The October, 1998 issue of the Journal of the National Cancer Institute published the study with an editorial concluding that the new study data, plus previous evidence, presented “an inescapable scientific conclusion . . . that ETS is a low-level lung carcinogen”. This journal publication was not, however, the first the public had heard of the IARC study. On March 8, 1998, the London Sunday Telegraph reported that WHO was withholding a study that not only failed to show that passive smoking caused lung cancer but also might even demonstrate a protective effect. British American Tobacco (BAT), which had held private media briefings to ensure “balanced” coverage of the forthcoming study, was suspected to have fuelled the story. BAT responded that it knew of IARC’s preliminary results from earlier conferences and IARC’s biennial report, which had reported the study’s progress by providing results but no conclusion. Despite press releases from WHO and
IARC\(^4\) noting that the study still awaited peer-review publication and calling the *Sunday Telegraph* interpretation of statistical significance “false and misleading”,\(^5\) the allegations quickly spread around the world, from Australia\(^6\) to Zimbabwe.\(^7\)

To understand the industry’s strategy towards the IARC study, we examined previously confidential tobacco industry documents that reveal how Philip Morris (PM) spearheaded an extensive inter-industry effort to stop, affect the wording of, delay, and counteract the IARC study.

**Data sources**

The tobacco industry documents are among 32 million pages made public as part of the settlement of the 1998 legal case of State of Minnesota and Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Minnesota vs Philip Morris Inc, et al. These documents are deposited in Minneapolis and each tobacco company has a searchable website archive. Search terms included IARC, IEMC, WRA, GEP, TASSC, NHANES (see glossary), “confounders,” and the names of key players. Most of the documents referred to here are on PM’s website.* We also asked IARC investigators (see acknowledgments) to describe their experience with the industry and to confirm information about themselves reported in certain documents.

**Initial fears and organisation**

The 1992 US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) report\(^8\) provided a comprehensive evaluation of second-hand smoke’s health effects that stimulated clean indoor air laws in the USA.\(^9\) As similar legislation increased worldwide, PM began monitoring research internationally to prevent further restrictions. By 1993, Philip Morris Corporate Services in Brussels expressed concern that the IARC study would become “Europe’s EPA”. PM also feared that IARC would produce, for example, theETS is a probable low risk carcinogen. There is no way we can convince the world that they are wrong. The critical regulatory issues is what the world will do about it [i].

PM decided on a proactive response rather than simply reacting after publication. The 1993 “IARC Objectives” were to:

- Delay the progress and/or release of the study
- Affect the wording of its conclusions and official statement of results
- Neutralize possible negative results of the study, particularly as a regulatory tool
- Counteract the potential impact of the study on government policy, public opinion, and actions by private employers and proprietors\(^10\)

These objectives formulated the beginnings of a coordinated strategy for scientific, communications, and government relations issues related to IARC. R W Murray (chairman of PM Companies) was presented with these details in 1993, and PM’s board of directors was informed of the proactive measures to deal with the study in 1995.

By September, 1993, PM had established a high-level, multidisciplinary task force with representatives from legal, research and development, science and technology, and corporate services departments (figure 1). The initial leader was Matthew Winokur of PM’s Worldwide Regulatory Affairs (WRA), a department created in July, 1993 for “the strategy and coordination of activities relating to environmental tobacco smoke and the social acceptability of smoking”. WRA’s 1994 budget was $66·1 million, with $2 million earmarked for the IARC plans. The IARC study is estimated to have cost $1·5–3·0 million over ten years.

PM also organised the industry worldwide, as Winokur (chair, PM IARC Task Force) reported on Jan 17, 1994: “PM initiated and chairs an industry-wide task force to manage both the IARC monitoring and scientific intelligence gathering process and the development of a global communications/government relations plan to address the [impact of the IARC study]”. Besides PM, the group included R J Reynolds (USA), Rothmans (UK), Imperial (UK), BAT (British American Tobacco), and Reemtsma (Germany). The group’s objective was to “coordinate plans and resources among the companies and in conjunction with National Manufacturers Associations”. This industry-wide task force is the International ETS Management Committee (IEMC).

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**Abbreviations**

BAT British American Tobacco
CIAR Tobacco industry’s Center for Indoor Air Research
EPA US Environmental Protection Agency
ESES European Science and Environment Forum
ETS Environmental tobacco smoke
GEP Good Epidemiological Practices
IARC International Agency for Cancer Research, Lyon, France
IEMC International ETS Management Committee
NHANES National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
PM Philip Morris tobacco company
PMCS Philip Morris Corporate Services
RJR R J Reynolds tobacco company
PMCS Philip Morris Corporate Services
TASSC The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition
WHO World Health Organization
WRA PM’s Worldwide Regulatory Affairs

*www.pmdocs.com; on this website the documents are identified by Bates number* and Lancet readers will find a list of the same documents used in this article attached to the version freely available on www.lancet.com. Some non-PM web sources are also referenced.

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**Figure 1: Philip Morris’ IARC Task Force structure**

CIAR, responsible for producing studies to offset the IARC study, would communicate with PM Europe Science and Technology and PM USA Scientific Affairs. These scientific departments would report to PM’s IARC Task Force team leader, who would communicate with the legal resources, PM Corporate Services in Brussels, and PM senior management.

Sources adapted from Bates 2023897132 at www.pmdocs.com.
National tobacco monopolies were also recruited. France’s Seita financially contributed to the IEMC-funded research, Japan Tobacco had a response plan to the IARC study by 1997, and Indian Tobacco Company and Korean Ginseng and Tobacco Research Institute were kept informed of the IEMC’s Asia-specific IARC preparations.

Scientific strategy

IARC study

In early 1993 PM had asked Covington and Burling “through their consultants, to try and uncover as much information as possible on the current status, etc., of the IARC study” and requested “all those who receive a copy of this memo to use whatever internal and external resources they may have or may know about to help us get more information on the IARC study as quickly as possible”. Covington and Burling, the industry’s Washington, DC based law firm, had established a network of sympathetic scientific consultants in Europe a few years before, known as “Project Whitecoat”, to help the industry “produce research or stimulate controversy”. These consultants systematically approached the IARC investigators, reporting back to the tobacco industry on the study’s design, questionnaire, progress and authors’ scientific viewpoints. Such efforts allowed PM to compile a picture of the IARC study and to begin assessing the study design for weaknesses.

Unaware of PM’s coordinated plans, IARC investigators were nonetheless cautious about discussing the results with industry representatives, but the consultants did not always disclose their industry affiliations. For example, PM obtained its most detailed intelligence about IARC in 1993–94 from the Italian consulting firm SCR Associati. One anonymous report described a meeting between the IARC investigators that recorded specific confidential results, including expected relative risks from different centres participating in the IARC study. The name of the consultant is not disclosed. The IARC investigators were not aware of a consultant’s presence. SCR Associati’s source of information in additional consultant reports about IARC was the late Giuseppe Lojacono (former professor of health economics, University of Perugia). Lojacono visited IARC several times in his role as a journal editor and inquired about the IARC study, without disclosing his relationship with the tobacco industry.

PM’s objectives in contacting the investigators went beyond tracking the study’s progress; a PMCS Brussels report describes its objectives (panel 2). PM was not contacting the investigators to help them improve the study but to promote the industry’s perspective about the study’s inadequacies.

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Panel 2: Philip Morris’ approach on IARC methodology

1. To ascertained a range of information on the study objectives, status, parameters, predisposition of IARC team/collaborators, timing, likely results, etc.

2. To brief the country collaborators and the IARC team on the industry perspective on ETS and to make them mindful of the weaknesses of epidemiology that rely on survey questionnaires. We recognise that there is (sic) down side to this in that our input could help them improve the quality of the study. However, it is considered that the benefits outweigh the risks if the collaborators can be persuaded that the IARC methodology is inadequate (it does not take into account confounders or measure actual exposure leading to misclassification). * 

The executive director of the industry’s Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) visited the IARC head investigators, who did not understand at the time that CIAR was funded by the tobacco companies. Winokur listed ideas on how to use CIAR to engage IARC: assisting IARC with future studies, encouraging IARC to include an industry consultant in designing analysis protocols, recruiting IARC investigators for CIAR-sponsored studies, and granting the senior IARC co-head-investigator funding or an advisory board position. IARC decided not to collaborate with CIAR. The industry did try to recruit individual investigators for a CIAR-sponsored study and one IARC-affiliated investigator did undertake a CIAR-funded study.

IARC monograph

In 1994, PM examined its options in influencing the outcome of a potential IARC monograph reviewing the health effects of second-hand smoke (panel 3). If PM could not shelf the monograph outright by redirecting financial or institutional priorities it would try to participate in the process and produce a “balanced perspective”. The inquiry into redirecting IARC’s priorities extended to the new IARC director, who, PM anticipated, would “be dealing with a strangled budget”. To its disappointment, PM later reported that the new IARC director was a “‘fervent antismoker’ who believes that ‘passive smoking is more dangerous than active smoking’”. Regarding the memorandum’s reference to the industry’s “balanced perspective”, the industry has sponsored and promoted “special reviewed” (not peer-reviewed) research projects awarded by industry executives,22 review articles,23 and symposium publications24,25 that generally conclude that second-hand smoke is not harmful. The reference to a “coffee precedent” refers to the preparation of an earlier IARC monograph, when Covington and Burling’s consultants “were able to give General Foods [a division of Philip Morris] considerable information about IARC’s evaluation of coffee as a possible risk factor for cancer”.

Anticipating the IARC study and monograph, IEMC funded research “to expose the weakness of epidemiology” through CIAR. PM commissioned two types of study in the same countries in which IARC
Panel 4: Philip Morris’ communication strategy

“Develop a communications programme to build appropriate public/policy climate in advance of the study results (PMCS, S&T, Legal).
Develop a contingency plan, should the preliminary results be leaked.
Assemble a crisis communications team/plan to manage the impact of the release of the study . . .
Evaluate the pros and cons of conducting journalist briefings prior to the release of the study.
Prepare pre/post public and leadership opinion surveys to evaluate the impact of the findings on public attitudes towards ETS and the need for smoking restrictions.
Develop a programme to generate support for ‘junk science’ and education on use and abuse of epidemiology, possibly through a coalition on bad science . . .
Develop a communications programme to mute/neutralise smoking bans/excessive restrictions . . .”

Panel 4: Philip Morris' communication strategy

conducted its study and projected the cost at $4 million. The CIAR studies were to be finished before publication of the IARC study. PM sought “to develop means of providing IARC with relevant data so they will either consider it in their report [monograph], or if they don’t, we will be in a position to ask them why”.

The first type of study monitored nonsmokers’ second-hand smoke exposure using personal air samples. Pilot studies were done by the US Oak Ridge National Laboratory,26,27 and UK Hazleton Laboratory;28 Hazleton subsequently did studies in the same countries as IARC,29–36 as well as in Asia and Latin America. Despite the reluctance of Hazleton’s parent company, PM was eager to promote an interpretation of the studies’ findings; later, the Aug 16, 1998, Sunday Telegraph reported that the studies demonstrated that “real-life levels” of second-hand smoke probably do not cause fatal diseases.37 The pilot studies were shown to be unreliable sources of data on second-hand smoke exposure at the US National Toxicology Program;38 results for salivary cotinine (a nicotine metabolite)39 were far below what was expected for the reported air nicotine levels. The industry’s prominent role in collecting the data may account for this result. RJR and its marketing research firm conducted all of the US study’s operations, with the author simply

The second type of study analysed the nonsmoking population for confounding factors other than second-hand smoke exposure that might explain a risk for cancer. Genevieve Matanoski and her colleagues’ analysis of a US nutritional survey was funded by CIAR.40 PM also planned to analyse similar large databases in Japan, Hungary, Germany, UK, Sweden, and Switzerland. PM also commissioned confounder studies from industry consultant Ragnar Rylander (University of Gothenburg)41,42 and worked with the German Verband (similar to the industry’s US Council for Tobacco Research) and the GESOMED research institute. As of 1999, an IARC investigator (Francesco Forastiere) was also conducting a CIAR-funded confounder study. Matanoski and Forastiere both acknowledged CIAR funding.

Communications strategy

PM planned a variety of programmes to deliver and reinforce the industry’s perspective on second-hand smoke, described in the September, 1993 “Action Plan” (panel 4).

The industry implemented these programmes before the IARC study’s release. Besides the programmes that were internally conducted, PM used third-party vehicles that recruited other participants and funders and expanded its “sound science” discussion to issues beyond second-hand smoke, masking the industry’s role as the initiator or sponsor of these programmes.

From 1993 to 1994, PM and public relations firm APCO Associates worked to launch The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC), a “grassroots” organisation advocating “sound science” in policy decision making. PM wanted a similar organisation in Europe at the end of 1994, with potentially sympathetic European scientists invited to a conference hosted by TASSC. However, Burson-Marsteller research indicated that potential European members wanted independence from any corporate sponsors; two people specifically mentioned PM as typical of questionable corporate sponsors. It appears that the outcome was the European Science and Environment Forum (ESEF), established in 1996,43 whose executive director sought funding from the tobacco companies. In December, 1997, ESEF and TASSC issued a joint press statement, in which both organisations have identical descriptions.44 ESEF now states45 that its funding only comes from sales of its working papers, one of which criticises IARC and the evidence on second-hand smoke. ESEF’s medical demographer, Lorraine Mooney, published a Wall Street Journal Europe opinion piece stating that the IARC study’s possibly “trivial or nonexistent” true risk ratio demonstrated the overstated health risks of second-hand smoke.46

Continuing the “sound science” theme, PM expanded the promotion of “Good Epidemiology Practices” (GEP), a guideline standardising the conduct of epidemiological research. The Chemical Manufacturers Association had originated GEP in 1991 and the idea was being pushed in Europe by chemical companies. However, PM found those guidelines inadequate, as PM’s Thomas Borelli commented: “. . . It lacks teeth and as written it does not have enough meat to help us on ETS. However setting up our own standards is a good project for us”. It would be “good offensive strategy” for their consultants to be “out there trying to fix epidemiology instead of being critical all the time”.

GEP was “urgently needed” to challenge the methodology of the IARC study and monograph review. PM drafted revised guidelines, covering IARC, for endorsement by a sound science coalition and planned a GEP seminar with members of European government bodies interacting with selected epidemiologists, screened out for anti-tobacco views. A European Council resolution on GEP was drafted by John Rupp of Covington and Burling. Seminars on good risk assessment and GEP were conducted by PM-sponsored Federal Focus Inc in the USA and UK,47 industry consultant Myron Weinberg’s The Weinberg Group in Europe, and CIAR in China.

The industry sought to manage and monitor the public’s perception of the IARC study’s results. European sentiment towards smoking restrictions was not reflected in legislative action: a 1989 PM survey in ten European countries concluded that “both smokers and non-smokers in Europe desire more rules in the future against smoking
in public places” and that Europeans are less opposed to government involvement with smoking than Americans (figure 2). Public relations firm Burson-Marsteller wrote a 13 page “Preparedness plans for the announcement of the IARC study”, and organised IEMC members into three teams for a coordinated interindustry response, to be delivered within 48 hours, to IARC’s findings, and PM management held “IARC simulation” response exercises.

PM realised that the tobacco industry had little credibility in Europe, and it turned to the media to promote its messages. PM had even considered producing its own journal to critique “the objective validity of statements claimed to be scientific—and therefore their technological or policy usefulness”. BAT instigated the March, 1998, press articles about the IARC study. A comprehensive press package included a prerecorded interview with BAT, background material on IARC and statistical results of second-hand smoke studies, and surveys of irritating behaviours. Winokur noted that the timing of the Sunday Telegraph story seems to have been designed to precede the release of the UK’s Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health report on passive smoking three days later.

**Government relations strategy**

In September, 1993, PM planned to develop a lobbying plan before and after the IARC study’s release. PM sought “key international government influence points” in the IARC donor countries for “generating pressure for reorientation/reprioritisation of IARC priorities/budget allocations”, and planned to lobby regulatory bodies and secure preemptive legislation against smoking restrictions.

In 1994, PM developed a “briefing book” about the IARC study for the industry’s messengers, allies, and government contacts to provide a standardised resource to support PM’s plans. The table of contents indicates that the book assesses possible bias by the investigators, critiques the study design, questions the role of epidemiology as a basis for policy, and drafts arguments for sympathetic allies and industries.

Besides the industry’s traditional concept of lobbying, the GEP programme was to become a lobbying tool, presumably to convince the EU to adopt a standard that would discredit the study. Indeed, the Commission of the EU sponsored the Weinberg-organised seminar, which had “the valuable concept of administrators being moderators, and hence, the target of the expert presentations in breakout sessions”. These moderators included representatives from the EU’s Directorates General V (Employment, Industrial Relations, and Social Affairs) and XII (Science, Research, and Development), the UK’s Environmental Agency, and Sweden’s EPA. PM planned to commit $220 000 to repeat the conference in Asia with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

The industry now cites the IARC study to government and regulatory bodies as evidence that second-hand smoke does not cause cancer, contrary to IARC’s conclusions, or that it has numerous flaws. Examples include Imperial Tobacco’s (a Canadian BAT subsidiary) published stance for legislators about smoking-related issues, the Tobacco Institute submission about a tobacco bill to the South African Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Health, and PM’s submission and testimony to the US National Toxicology Program review of second-hand smoke.

**Discussion**

The massive effort launched across the tobacco industry against one scientific study is remarkable. Whereas over ten years (1988–98) the IARC study is estimated to have cost $1·5–3·0 million, PM alone budgeted at least $2 million for “IARC” plans for just one year (1994) and proposed $4 million for studies to help discredit IARC’s work. The elaborate plans were developed by PM’s top management, implemented by an elite task force, and designed to coordinate the international tobacco industry.

The complex plan relied on third-party vehicles that did not reveal the extent of the industry’s efforts to shape the scientific, communications, and government relations issues of second-hand smoke on a worldwide basis. Such long-term programmes, from scientific consultants to “sound science” coalitions to GEP seminars, were instituted to influence the scientific basis of policymaking and public perception on second-hand smoke more in favour of the industry. BAT’s March, 1998, media event presented the IARC study and public relations campaign as evidence that second-hand smoke does not cause cancer, contrary to IARC’s conclusions, despite the study’s flaws.

The book assesses possible bias by the investigators, critiques the study design, questions the role of epidemiology as a basis for policy, and drafts arguments for sympathetic allies and industries. BAT’s media misrepresentation was not the first time the industry misrepresented a second-hand smoke study’s results as showing no risk. In 1981, Lawrence Garfinkel...
of the American Cancer Society published a paper which, like the IARC study, reported an increase in risk (relative risk=1.27) that did not reach statistical significance (95% CI, 0.85–1.89). Garfinkel noted this failure might have been related to methodological problems. The US Tobacco Institute ran advertisements in major US newspapers and magazines claiming that the Garfinkel study demonstrated an “insignificant” and “very little, if any” effect on lung cancer and nonsmokers. Finally, three years later, in 1984, Garfinkel protested in a letter to the New York Times that the industry had taken his work out of context and distorted the results. After the Tobacco Institute of Australia ran a similar advertisement in 1986, the Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations successfully sued the Tobacco Institute of Australia on the grounds that the advertisement was false and misleading.

The IARC and Garfinkel examples demonstrate how the tobacco industry has been trying to shape the scientific debate on the statistical interpretation of second-hand smoke studies. The industry imposes a one-sided interpretation of confidence intervals, focusing on the entire discussion on whether the lower bound of the 95% CI for a relative risk includes 1. By definition, if the lower bound exceeds 1, then the risk is statistically significantly raised (with p=0.05). Whether or not there is anything magic about 95%, the true risk is equally likely to be anywhere inside the 95% CI, including values above the point estimate. In environmental and health and safety regulation, it is common to take the health-protective approach of basing public policy on the upper 95% confidence limit (1.44 and 1.45 for the IARC study). The industry’s discussions of the risks of passive smoking ignore the upper end of the confidence interval.

The IARC study’s results did not reach statistical significance, and the IARC investigators noted that this was due to the study’s low power. The IARC study was originally designed to have a statistical power of 80% to detect a relative risk of 1.3—rather than a more realistic expected risk of around 1.2. Detecting this lower risk with 95% confidence would have required a larger sample size than the study used (because it was powered based on the higher presumed risk of 1.3). Hence, despite a point estimate above 1 for the risk in the study, this low power produced a wide confidence interval, too wide for statistical significance. The industry has represented the fact that the increase in risk observed did not reach statistical significance as indicating that the study did not find any increased risk.

The IARC study may, in fact, have underestimated the true relative risk of lung cancer associated with second-hand smoke. An industry statistical criticism, given much consideration by IARC and others, relates to the misclassification of smokers as nonsmokers. Such a misclassification error would incorrectly raise the numerator in the risk ratio because active smoking increases the risk of lung cancer. This error, however, has been repeatedly shown to be small, including in the IARC report itself. In contrast, another misclassification error, new to this discussion, has been in the industry’s and public’s misunderstanding of the “unexposed” group. People in the “unexposed” group are actually exposed to background second-hand smoke. This error biases results towards the null, leading to systematic underestimates of the effect of second-hand smoke. Repape, for example, estimated the effects of background exposure to secondhand smoke and found that properly correcting the Garfinkel study for background levels increases the point estimate of the relative risk from 1.2 to 1.7. The study validating the IARC study’s questionnaire included results suggesting that women are exposed to a background level of secondhand smoke not reflected in the questionnaire. The IARC lung cancer study only adjusted for the industry’s form of misclassification bias in the relative risk ratio’s numerator and did not similarly adjust the denominator. The true point estimates of risk of lung cancer in the IARC study may very well be above the reported 1.16 and 1.17.

Scientists and policy makers need to understand that they function in an environment that is heavily influenced by covert tobacco industry efforts to subvert the normal decision-making processes. The industry has in the past submitted material to major scientific evaluations similar to the potential IARC monograph in New Zealand, Australia, and UK when these countries were evaluating the health effects of second-hand smoke. The industry has filed lawsuits over scientific decisions to exclude this material. However, each report’s conclusions that second-hand smoke causes lung cancer and other diseases remains unchanged.

Contrary to the tobacco industry’s fears, IARC has not yet decided to prepare a monograph on the health effects of second-hand smoke. Public attention has been focused on lung cancer, but it is important to remember that heart disease, not lung cancer, kills most passive smokers. Moreover, second-hand smoke’s health effects range from asthma in children to sudden infant death syndrome, with recent research suggesting breast cancer as another possible health effect. The strenuous effort mounted by the industry to subvert the IARC study and prevent an IARC monograph is probably the most compelling justification for IARC to prepare such a publication that considers not just lung cancer but all the diseases that second-hand smoke causes.

Supported by US National Cancer Institute grant CA-61021. We thank Paolo Boffetta, Rodolfo Saracci, Lorenzo Simonato, and Francesco Forastiere for informative discussions.

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